1) adverse selection model
逆向选择模型
1.
Under the framework of information asymmetry that the buyer has asymmetric information about the suppliers\' production cost,we propose an adverse selection model to reveal the actual cost of suppliers,and then characterize the optimal contracts.
基于委托人视角,给出了委托人如何诱导代理人报告自己真实成本信息的逆向选择模型,并刻画了最优合约的特征。
2.
To construct social credit system of food security by adverse selection model will enhance the quality safety of China\'s food effectively and international competitiveness.
采用逆向选择模型构建食品安全社会信用体系,可以有效促进我国食品质量安全的提高,增强国际竞争力。
2) adverse selection
逆向选择
1.
On the Adverse Selection of Cooperative Medical System And Its Precaution;
新型农村合作医疗制度下逆向选择问题及防范
2.
Problem of adverse selection under two-sided uncertainty;
基于双方不确定性的逆向选择问题
3.
Adverse Selection of Equipment Acquisition Market and its Cure Policy──A mechanism design to cure the adverse selection of enterprise;
装备采办市场的逆向选择及其根治策略——一种根治采办市场逆向选择的机制设计
3) Converse Selection
逆向选择
1.
The principal-agent relationship between supplier and buyer was analyzed on asymmetrical information conditions by which the unobservability of quality level is regarded as that the supplier concealed information from the buyer and,in fact,it is a converse selection problem of t.
研究非对称信息条件下供应链管理的质量控制问题·建立了供应链合作关系中的购买商和供应商的质量成本模型,其中包括供应商的生产理性约束条件·分析了非对称信息条件下购买商与供应商质量成本的委托代理关系,质量水平的不可观测性则表现为供应商的信息隐匿·实质上,这是一个委托代理中的逆向选择问题·购买商的质量成本是目标函数,供应商质量成本的一阶条件转化为状态空间方程,运用极大值原理求解该问题的最优质量控制·并进行了非对称信息条件下供应链的质量控制仿真实验
2.
By this model, the authors reveal the mechanism of technology-stock based cooperation innovation, study converse selection in technology-stock based cooperation innovation and signal transmitting function of technology-stock proportion to alleviate adverse selection, as well as the significance of reputation mechanism to technology-stock based cooperation.
运用博弈论和信息经济学的理论与方法构建了技术入股合作创新的市场均衡模型,揭示了技术入股合作创新的实现机理,并对技术入股合作中的逆向选择问题、技术入股比例的信号传递作用以及信誉机制在技术入股合作创新中的重要意义进行了探讨。
3.
By application of theoretical models,this paper analyzes the converse selection and moral risk occurred in credit market.
通过建立经济模型对信贷市场中的逆向选择和道德风险进行深入的理论分析,提出了防范由信息不对称引起的逆向选择和道德风险的对策,以期提高整个信贷市场的效率。
4) converse choice
逆向选择
1.
On converse choice of accounting policy in enterprises;
企业会计政策逆向选择问题研究
2.
This paper discussed the investor how to conquer the trouble of converse choice by the contract of residual rights of claimant and control.
如果科技成果的持有人选择组建一家新的企业,则他们与投资者之间的契约是解决逆向选择问题的一个有效途径。
3.
So the assymetrical information the employer and the employee in job market possess usually lead to the converse choices and moral risks.
这就出现了雇佣双方的信息不对称,从而导致"逆向选择"与"道德风险"。
5) reverse choice
逆向选择
1.
The conclusion is as follows:Under the premise that small and medium enterprises have no sufficient collateral security for LGD,although raising the quality of accounting information can resolve part of information asymmetry problem,it can not resolve the reverse choice and moral hazard from this.
根据信息经济学的基本理论,应用数理模型探讨中小企业会计信息质量与中小企业融资的关系,得出的结论是:在中小企业无足够抵押担保品等违约损失的前提下,虽然提高会计信息质量部分解决了信息不对称问题,但并未解决由此产生的逆向选择和道德风险,在一定情况下还可能加大逆向选择和道德风险。
2.
Combining with researches at home and abroad,this paper discusses high interest rate of credit card from search and conversion cost,reverse choice and consumer behavior,providing reference for understanding the high interest rate of credit card in our country.
文章结合国内外研究成果,分别从搜索成本、转换成本、逆向选择以及消费者行为等角度探讨了信用卡的高利率现象,对理解我国信用卡利率行为具有一定的参考意义。
3.
the financial accounting can only offer relatively relevant and reliable information,it is limited to act on in controlling the reverse choice and morals risk,having formed the obstacle to realize the accounting goal,this forces information user to have to look for other information channel,in the hope of more effective decision.
会计只能提供相对相关和可靠的信息,在控制逆向选择和道德风险方面作用有限,形成了会计目标实现的障碍,这迫使投资者不得不去寻找其他信息渠道,以期更有效地决策。
6) reverse selection
逆向选择
1.
This paper introduced the reverse selection and moral hazard problem caused by asymmetric information,which caused the commercial bank credit appeared the phenomenon of be loath to loan.
介绍了由于信息不对称产生的逆向选择和道德风险问题,使商业银行的信贷出现了“惜贷”现象,引发了存款客户盲目选择银行、中小企业融资困难等问题,而且使不良贷款增加。
2.
The causes are as follows:information asymmetry,theory of principal and agent,moral hazard and reverse selection,etc.
商业银行信贷风险产生的原因包括信息不对称、委托——代理行为、败德行为、逆向选择
补充资料：逆向选择
美国总统克林顿曾经为很多美国人支付不起医疗保险费而感到不可思议。然而经济学家说，这没有什么好奇怪的。因为在保险公司与投保人之间存在着信息不对称：保险公司并不像投保人自己那样了解他们的身体状况。因此，尽管保险公司清楚一些人患病的风险比其他人高，但是它仍然无法向这些人收取更高的保险费，因为它不知道他们是谁，它只好按照投保人患病的平均风险收取保险费。那些患病风险较低的人因而会觉得保险费过高，他们就会退出保险。其结果是投保人患病的平均风险升高，保险公司为了不亏本，只能跟着提高保险费，于是就会有更多的人退出保险，直至市场崩溃。这就是逆向选择效应：投保人的构成随着保险费的升高而发生逆向变化。逆向选择不仅仅在保险市场上存在，在很多信息不对称的场合都会出现。
说明：补充资料仅用于学习参考，请勿用于其它任何用途。
参考词条