From the point of view of construction-agent,the rent-creating behavior of owner influences the deputy cost and causes decrease of expected benefit of construction-agent and owner,which cannot influence the optimal sharing coefficient of construction-agent to investment surplus.

Analysis of the rent-seeking behavior in the engineering supervision based on the game;

The economic reasons for rent-seeking behavior are unfair market competition and unreasonable institions.

Studies on rent seeking and evading in the bid of governmental projects;

The rent seeking theory made its first appearance in the western world in the 1960s.

Game analysis on rent-seeking activities of the construction agent under agent system for South to North Water Transfer Project;

To reduce rent resources and stop rent-seeking activities are the demand of standardizing tourism market.

Analysis of agent s rent-seeking action in the principal-agent relations of firm;

The occurrence of surplus of the objects and unsymmetry of information,along with the imperfection of market result in the rent-seeking action.

By modelling rent-seeking activity,the paper concludes that if only the governmental intervention exists,the economic-man may put in resource to get the protected marginal profit limited by government.