1.
Inefficiency of Local Government s Performance:Two Principal-agent Inefficiency and Its Policy Signification.;
地方政府考核：双重委托人失效及其政策含义
2.
Double-Principal Agent Theorem in Application to the Tax Evasion
双重委托-代理理论在税收流失中的应用
3.
The Dual-entrusted Responsibilities of Financial Headers from Agency Theory;
从委托代理理论看财务负责人的双重受托责任
4.
A Research on Equity Incentive Effect Based on Double Principal-agent Theory
双重委托治理框架下股权激励效应研究
5.
Study on Comprehensive Governance Under Double Principal-agent Theory of Venture Capital--the Effect of Conduction
风险投资双重委托代理关系综合治理——传导效应研究
6.
Strengthening Regulations on Senior Executives of Chinese Commercial Banks--a case study on the double-layer principle-agent relationship;
加强对银行高级管理人员的监管:基于双重委托代理关系的分析
7.
Research on Financial Contract Arrangement Based on Double Principal-agent Theory;
双重委托代理下的财务契约安排研究
8.
Research on Two Layers of Principal-agent in Venture Capital
风险投资中的双重委托代理关系研究
9.
If such appointment results in loss to the agent, it may seek indemnification from the principal.
因此给受托人造成损失的，受托人可以向委托人要求赔偿损失。
10.
Where the agent acted beyond the scope of authorization, thereby causing loss to the principal, it shall pay damages.
受托人超越权限给委托人造成损失的，应当赔偿损失。
11.
Game Analysis of the Double Principal-agent Relationship in Venture Investment;
创业投资中双重委托代理关系的博弈分析
12.
A Model Based on Double Principal-agent to Screen product Quality;
基于双重委托代理的产品质量甄别模型
13.
Analysis on the Playing of Dual Entrusting of Acting for the Risk in the Risk Investment;
风险投资中双重委托代理风险的博弈分析
14.
Research of Double Principal-agent Theory Using Holmstrom and Milgrom's Model
基于Holmstrom和Milgrom模型的双重委托代理问题研究
15.
The Invalidation of Valuation Industry Supervision from the Perspective of Principal-Agent Theory;
从委托代理角度看价值评估行业监管失效问题
16.
Analysis of the efficiency losing under the agency by agreement;
委托代理关系下的效率损失问题的分析
17.
On Principal-Agent Problem &Efficiency Loss in Banking Supervision System;
银行监管制度中委托—代理问题与效率损失
18.
The Optimal Incentive and Incentive Compatibility with Dual Status of Principal and Agent:A Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in Cross-ownership Holdings;
委托人—代理人双重身份下的最优激励与激励相容——相互持股道德风险问题的博弈分析