A dynamic incentive model of relative performance evaluation in supply chain;

In order to study the effect of relative performance evaluation on behavior of venture entrepreneur under reputation incentive mechanism of venture capital investment,the product function of venture firms was improved,and dynamic game models were constructed.

This paper analyses the optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and executives under asymmetric information condition through mathematical analytic methods with ability and relative performance evaluation consid- ered.

Considering the comparative performance information, the paper used principal-agent theory to study the best reward contract for the managers which regarded money income and enjoying leisure as managers goad, and analyzed the agency costs under asymmetric information.

In order to seek a comparison advantage in seasoned equity offerings,each firm has strong incentive to acquire relative performance through earnings management,and enhances potential investors assessment of its profitability and investment value.

This paper sets up a model to evaluate relative performance of executives based on efficacy coefficient method and studies the relationship between relative performance and motivation status through empirical study on 32 listed companies in communication and relative equipments production industry.

After information structure and the investment strategy sets have been described,this paper constructs a programming model used to solve the optimal relative performance contract.

resetting price option, double-barrier price option and comparative performance option aimed to solve the problem are constructed and contrasted with the traditional executive.